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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we address two related issues. First, we test whether micro firms run 
by migrants pay more for credit than firms run by native entrepreneurs. Second, we 
verify whether the differences in the cost of credit between these two groups of 
entrepreneurs decrease as long as the informational and cultural gap narrow.  To this 
aim we employ a large and unique data set providing us with detailed information 
about each overdraft loan granted by banks to sole proprietorships based in Italy. We 
find that firms run by migrants pay, on average, almost 70 basis points more for 
credit than those run by entrepreneurs born in Italy. The interest rate differential is 
lower for entrepreneurs born in Italy whose parents were natives of other countries 
(“second generation” migrants) and, among those born abroad, for migrants whose 
parents were natives of Italy (“Italian migrants”). These results suggest that cultural 
differences may matter for the functioning of the credit market. A lengthening in 
credit history may help migrants to “bridge the gap”. We find that, on average, 
interest rates lower with the length of the credit history. Furthermore, and more 
importantly from the paper perspective, firms run by migrants benefit more from a 
repeated interaction with the banking system. Finally, we find that the size of the 
migrant community and the improvements in bank ability to deal with cultural 
diversity both contribute to narrow the interest rate differential between migrant and 
Italian entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
                                                
 
The recent strong growth of migrant entrepreneurship provides banking systems 
with new lending opportunities. However, lending to firms run by migrants may 
require specific skills and investments. Besides those related to small firm 
lending in general, stemming from informational opaqueness, lending to foreign 
firms may require some further effort to ‘bridge the gap’ between the lender and 
the borrower due to cultural and institutional differences between the home and 
the host country. Everything being equal, migrant creditworthiness might be 
more difficult to assess compared to other borrowers. Furthermore, apart from 
informational gaps, cultural and institutional differences between countries may 
also fuel skepticism or mistrust towards migrants. All these factors are likely to 
adversely affect the access by migrants to the credit market.  
 
 
° Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. *Bank of Italy, Economic Research Unit, Potenza 
Branch.  
1 We wish to thank Giorgio Gobbi and Enrico Sette for helpful comments on a preceding version of 
the paper and Cristiana Rampazzi for excellent research assistance. 
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In this paper, we address two related issues. First, we test whether micro firms 
run by migrants pay more for credit than firms run by native entrepreneurs. 
Second, we verify whether the differences in the cost of credit between these 
two groups of entrepreneurs lower as long as the informational and cultural gap 
narrow. To this aim we employ a large and unique data set containing detailed 
information on loan contracts obtained from the Italian Credit Register (CR) and 
the Bank of Italy Survey on Loan Interest Rates.2 This is the first paper which 
addresses these issues for Italy. To our best knowledge, this paper is also the 
first to investigate different channels by which the gap between migrants and 
banks may be bridged. 
 
Italy is a suitable country for investigating these issues because migrant 
entrepreneurship is a growing and recent phenomenon. As of December 2009 
the number of sole proprietorships run by migrants were over 250,000, more 
than twice than in 2003, when they were around 100,000. Migration and foreign 
entrepreneurship, in particular, are relatively new phenomena for Italy. This 
may exacerbate the difficulties migrants may encounter in accessing the credit 
market in Italy compared to other countries which are more accustomed to lend 
to minorities. 
 
The literature on the access to credit markets by minorities focuses mostly on 
the United States. Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) and, more recently, 
Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002), Blanchflower, Levine and 
Zimmerman (2003) provide evidence that banks discriminate against firms 
owned by African-Americans; the analysis by Fraser (2009) concerns the small 
business credit in the UK. Other papers have investigated the credit market for 
households (e.g., Browne, McEneane, Munnell and Tootell, 1996; Tootell, 1996; 
Ross and Yinger, 2002; Edelberg, 2007) showing that discrimination in the 
market for mortgages is less important than in business lending. Giannetti and 
Yafeh (2008), studying the market for syndicated loans, show that the greater is 
the cultural distance between the lender and the borrower the less favorable are 
the credit conditions charged. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2007) provide 
similar evidence concerning venture capital market. More in general, Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2006) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggest that 
cultural factors affect economic outcomes. Other studies indicate that the 
different level of creditor protection in the native countries affects migrant 
access to financial services in the host one (Osili and Paulson, 2005 and 2006).  
 
According to the results of our empirical analysis, firms run by migrants pay, on 
average, almost 70 basis points more for credit than those run by entrepreneurs 
born in Italy. We then investigate different channels by which the interest rate 
differential between migrants and Italians may narrow. First, we verify whether 
the cost of credit for migrants converge to the one charged to natives as long as 
the relationship with the banking system goes on. In particular, we find that the 
interest rate spread lowers as the credit history lengthens. We interpret the fact 
that firms run by migrants, due to their higher ex-ante “opaqueness”, benefit 
more from a repeated interaction with the banking system as a prove that it 
conveys relatively more information to banks about migrant entrepreneurs 
compared to other firms. Besides that, lengthening of credit history helps 
migrants better participate in the financial sector ((“financial integration”). 
Notwithstanding these effects, the interest rate differential does not disappear. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the data used in the paper see par. 2 below. 
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This might be due to a persisting cultural gap between banks and migrants. This 
interpretation is consistent with the evidence concerning the cost of credit for 
some entrepreneurs which are presumably quite cultural affine to natives: a) the 
interest rate differential is lower for entrepreneurs born in Italy whose parents 
are from abroad (second generation migrants) and b) among those born abroad, 
for migrants whose family was originally Italian (Italian migrants). Secondly, we 
show that a wide migrant social networking also reduces the interest rate gap. 
This result suggests that banks may obtain relevant information not only 
through a repeated interaction with the same borrower but also by interacting 
with different borrowers of the same type. Finally, the interest rate spread 
between migrants and natives lowers as long as banks ability to deal with 
cultural diversities improves.  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data. 
The third section presents the results of our econometric analysis concerning the 
existence of an interest rate differential between migrant and Italian 
entrepreneurs. In the fourth one we investigate the ways by which the interest 
rate differential may be narrowed. The fifth one concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
 
The data come from two sources: the Credit Register (CR) run by the Bank of 
Italy, containing detailed information on all loan contracts granted to each 
borrower whose total debt from a bank is above 75,000 euros (30,000 euros 
since January 2009; no threshold  is required for bad loans), and the Bank of 
Italy Loan Interest Rate Survey, including information on interest rates charged 
on each loan granted by a sample of about 200 Italian banks. This sample is 
highly representative of the Italian market for loans to small firms: these banks 
account for over 80 per cent of the total loans granted to micro firms. 
Furthermore, the sample is representative of the universe of Italian banks in 
terms of bank size, category and location.  
 
Data refers to overdraft loans granted to micro firms. We focus on micro firms 
(sole proprietorships) for two main reasons. First, by looking at their fiscal code, 
obtained from the CR, it’s straightforward to identify migrants’ countries of 
origin. Second, sole proprietorships are widely spread in Italy and they also 
prevail among de-novo firms.  
 
We investigate overdraft facilities (i.e. credit lines) for the following reasons. 
First, this kind of lending represents the main liquidity management tool for very 
small firms which cannot afford more sophisticated instruments. Second, since 
these loans are highly standardized among banks, the comparison between the 
cost of credit among firms is not affected by unobservable (to econometrician) 
loan-contract specific covenants. Third, overdraft facilities are loans granted 
neither for some specific purpose, as is the case for mortgages, nor on the basis 
of a specific trade transaction, as is the case for advances against trade credit 
receivables. As a consequence, according to Berger and Udell (1995) the pricing 
of these loans is highly associated with the borrower-lender relationship, thus 
providing us with a better tool for testing the existence of discrimination against 
migrant entrepreneurs. 
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After a cleaning procedure, we end up with a sample of  over 2.4 million 
observations related to 18 quarters from March 2004 to June 2008.3 The 
number of migrant firms is much lower (about 5,000) than that of native firms 
(almost 225,000). Apart from that, our sample is highly unbalanced. In 
particular, migrants tend to be concentrated in few towns and sectors. They 
show a quite shorter credit history and they tend to borrow from a lower 
number of banks compared to natives. Non-Italian entrepreneurs are relatively 
younger than Italian ones (table 1). Those with less than 40 years account for 
50 per cent of migrant entrepreneurs, compared to only 30 per cent for Italians. 
They are also relatively more likely to run firms in the construction sector. The 
average size is similar to that of the Italian ones, even if artisans are more 
widespread among migrants. The share of migrants’ micro firms run by women 
(26 per cent) is higher than that for Italians (19 per cent). Credit history of 
Italian entrepreneurs is twice the one of migrant ones.  Most of the migrant 
firms are located in Northern Italy (over 65 per cent); 24 per cent of them are 
located in Central Italy, while only 11 per cent are in Southern Italy.  
 
Due to these strong distributional differences, in the next section we also show 
the results of the econometric analysis based on a smaller but highly balanced 
sample. 
 
   
3. Do migrants pay more for credit ? 
 
In this section we test whether micro firms run by migrants pay more for credit 
than those run by natives. The basic regression equation is the following: 
 
(i)  ri,j,t = α + θimmij + βfirmj,t + γcrediti,j,t + δpublic aidj,t + μcredit historyj,t + ρtimet +  εi,j,t 
  
where r is the interest rate charged to the overdraft loan granted by bank i to 
firm j at the quarter t, immi is a dummy which equals 1 for micro firms run by 
migrants, 0 otherwise (see table 2 for a detailed description of the variables 
used in our estimates).  
 
Firm represents a set of control variables concerning firm characteristics 
including economic sector (around 200 economic sectors) and firm location (103 
provinces) dummies, and age of the entrepreneur.  
 
Credit is a set of controls for bank lending characteristics: loan size, presence of 
real guarantees specifically posted to overdraft loans, number of banks financing 
the firm, and a dummy taking the value of 1 if other banks different from bank i  
classify some loan granted to firm j as a bad loan.  
 
Public aid is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm has benefited from 
public subsidies, 0 otherwise; migrant firms may be less able to receive public 
subsidies, which may affect credit conditions. 
 
We control for the number of quarters elapsed since the first time the firm has 
been recorded in the CR (credit history) to be sure that the interest rate 
                                                 
3  To exclude outliers data have been trimmed to the 1-99 percentile of the interest rate 
distribution. 
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differential between migrant firms and the others is not due to a shorter length 
of their credit history. 
 
Finally, to control for changes in macroeconomic conditions during the sample 
period, we include quarter fixed effects (time).  
 
Table 3 reports our estimation results. According to equation in column 1, 
migrants pay 68 basis points more for credit compared to other firms. In the 
following equations, we restrict our sample in order to improve the balancing 
between migrant and non migrant firms. As shown by descriptive statistics, 
migrants tend to be concentrated in specific economic sectors, towns, firm size 
classes and gender. They also borrow from a lower number of banks and they 
may differ significantly in terms of credit history length. Thus, to improve the 
accuracy of our estimates, for each combination of “lender-firm sector-firm size-
firm town-firm gender-firm first year of reporting to the CR” observed among 
migrants (7040 different combinations) we look for the same combination 
among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced 
sample of more than 74,000 observations, referring in 48 per cent of cases to 
migrant firms.   
 
Regression run on this smaller sample confirms the previous result, indicating 
that interest rates charged to migrants are higher (by 62 basis points) than 
those charged to the other firms (column 2). We also check if bank 
characteristics affect the cost of credit for migrant entrepreneurs introducing the 
dummy variable largebank and its interaction with immi. The results of the 
estimate show that large banks charge higher interest rates to all entrepreneurs, 
and that the interest rate differential between the two types of entrepreneurs is 
lower with respect to other banks (column 3). 
 
Equation in column 4 adds “pair” fixed effects, i.e. we add dummies for each 
observed combination we used to balance the sample. In this way we jointly 
control for lender, firm sector, firm size, firm town, entrepreneur gender, firm 
first year of reporting to the CR. Again, we find that migrants pay almost 70 
basis points more for credit than natives. 
 
Finally, results in column 5 suggest that migrants are not all the same. We 
proxy differences among foreign entrepreneurs with their continent of origin. 
The results indicate that entrepreneurs from Eastern Europe pay interest rates 
1.3 percentage points higher than those charged to Italian entrepreneurs; those 
from Asia and Africa almost 40 and 85 basis points more respectively. 
Entrepreneurs from Central and Latin America pay interest rates over 20 basis 
points higher than those paid by Italian ones. Interest rates charged on 
entrepreneurs from North America and Oceania are not statistically different 
from those charged to Italian ones. 
 
A possible objection to the previous results is that the CR threshold affects 
migrants and natives in a different way thus biasing our results. In particular, in 
case migrant entrepreneurs were less rationed than natives our result would 
over-estimate the interest rate differential. In other words, it might be the case 
that the CR threshold is such that, even if migrants and natives are of the same 
type, i.e. the distribution of default risk is exactly the same, banks may be, for 
some  reasons, relatively more likely to lend to riskier migrant firms compared 
to native ones. As a consequence, due to some unobserved variable which 
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correlates with risk, the estimated higher cost of credit observed for migrants is 
only due to such a bias.  
 
To deal with this issue we exploit a sort of natural experiment. As of January 
2009 the CR census threshold was lowered from 75.000 to 30.000 euro. We 
exploit this regulatory change to assess whether migrant firms are more often 
rationed than native firms. In particular, we estimate a probit model for the 
probability a firm is between the 75.000 and 30.000 euro threshold: those firms 
which present a higher probability would suffer more from quantity rationing. In 
practice, we look for those firms which are reported to the Credit Register in 
January 2009, just after the threshold has been lowered to 30.000 euro, and 
would not be reported in case the threshold was still equal to 75.000 euro. Then 
we check if this probability is lower for migrants, compared to observationally 
equivalent natives, by estimating the following probit equation: 
 
(ii) Prob(“rationing”j )= α + ξimmij + βother firm characteristicsj + εj 
 
where firm characteristics include firms’ size, economic sector and province of 
location.  
 
We find that for migrants, everything being equal, the probability of being 
“rationed” is 1.2 per cent higher than for natives. This implies that, if any, our 
previous results about the interest rate differential are downward biased, i.e. the 
CR census threshold is more binding for migrants than for natives and, as a 
consequence, natives reported to the CR tend to be on average riskier than 
migrants. 
 
This result is also consistent with the higher cost for credit paid by migrants, 
supporting the view that migrants not only pay more for credit but they also  
tend to obtain less credit than other similar firms.  
 
 
4. Bridging the gap between migrants and the banking system 
 
In the previous section we showed that migrants pay more for credit than 
natives. This interest rate differential may be attributed to different reasons: 
differences in the default risk of the two types of entrepreneurs, the fact that 
banks can associate to single migrant entrepreneurs the characteristics of their 
countries of origin (“statistical discrimination”), “taste-based discrimination”. We 
don’t have the information necessary to assess the relative importance of these 
explanations. From now on we investigate the ways by which interest rate 
differential may be narrowed.  
 
In section 4.1 we test whether migrants benefit more from a lengthening in their 
credit history than natives. Cultural and institutional differences between the 
home and the host country may imply that migrants are ex-ante more opaque 
than natives. As a consequence, banks may learn more about foreign borrowers 
than natives by a repeated interaction. Furthermore, since cultural and 
institutional differences may fuel some skepticism and mistrust against 
migrants, they benefit more from reputational effects when well-behaving over 
their credit history. Finally, lengthening of credit history helps migrants better 
participate in the financial sector (“financial integration”). 
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Section 4.2 shows that cultural integration also helps migrant narrow the 
interest rate differential. We test this by indentifying “second generation” 
migrants among entrepreneurs born in Italy whose parents were from abroad 
and  “Italian migrants”  among entrepreneurs born abroad whose parents were 
originally Italian.  Indeed, these two groups of entrepreneurs might be more 
cultural affine to natives compared to “pure” migrants (i.e. migrants born 
abroad whose parents were also foreign). 
 
Another channel by which the gap may be bridged is related to the reputation of 
the community of migrants as a whole. In section 4.3 we explore this possibility 
by testing whether the size of the migrant business network helps foreign firms 
access the credit market.  
 
Finally, bank improvements in interacting with migrants may represent another 
channel to bridge the gap between migrants and the banking system. In section 
4.4. we test if the recent upgrading in the supply of financial products to 
migrants may involve better conditions in their access to the banking system. 
 
 
4.1 Credit history 
 
The differential between interest rates on loans to migrant and Italian firms may 
be due to a lack of credit history of the former, which have accessed the credit 
market more recently than the latter. On one hand, a repeated interaction with 
the banking system may help banks better assess firms’ creditworthiness, in 
particular for opaque firms. On the other hand, the lengthening of their credit 
history may help migrants better deal with banks. Indeed, by a repeated 
interaction they may better comprehend the rules and the functioning of the 
host banking system and consequently obtain better credit conditions. We then 
expect that the length of the credit history has a greater impact on migrant 
financing conditions since, apart from helping bank overcome asymmetries of 
information, it helps migrants better participate in the financial sector (“financial 
integration”).  
 
To test this hypothesis we estimate the following equation: 
 
(iii)   ri,j,t = α + θimmij + βfirmj,t +   γcrediti,j,t + δpublic aidj,t + μcredit historyj,t*noimmij   + 
νcredit historyj,t*immij + ρtimet +  εi,j,t 
 
which adds to econometric model (i) two interaction terms: one is credit 
history*immi and the other is credit history*noimmi, where immi and noimmi 
are dummy variables which equal 1 if the firm is run by a migrant (a non 
migrant for noimmi), and 0 otherwise. This allows us to test if the length of the 
relationship with the banking system has a greater impact on migrant cost of 
credit, consistently with the view that the length of credit history is a proxy for 
migrant financial integration.  
 
Results reported in column 1 of table 4 show that migrants benefit more than 
natives from an increase in their credit history length, consistently with our 
hypothesis that, due to an ex-ante greater opaqueness, banks learn more about 
migrants than natives by a repeated interaction. It may also reflect the fact 
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that, as long as banks and migrants know each other better, mistrust and 
skepticism tend to soften. This factor is reasonably less important for native 
firms which are culturally similar to bank officers. As a consequence, this factor 
may also contribute to the narrowing in the interest rate differential driven by 
credit history lengthening. 
 
However, our results might be also due to a survival bias affecting natives and 
migrants in a different way.  Indeed, the length of credit history is highly 
correlated with the quality of the firm. It might be the case that, as long as 
credit history lengthens, riskier borrowers default and then drop out from the 
sample. If this process is faster for migrants compared to natives, then at least 
part of the reduction in the interest rate differential related to credit history 
might be due to an asymmetric survival bias. Our previous result on the 
probability of rationing suggests that, if any, an asymmetric survival bias exists 
but it goes in the direction of widening the interest rate differential between 
migrants and natives when their credit history lengthens. We showed that 
migrants tend to be more frequently rationed by banks, implying that ex-ante 
they are less risky than natives. This evidence suggests that creditworthiness 
evaluation by banks tends to be stricter with respect to migrants. 
 
If this hypothesis is true, the exit from our sample should concern migrant 
entrepreneurs more than Italian ones. To check this hypothesis we construct a 
sample including only those firms which began a relationship with the banking 
system during the first year of our sample period (2004 cohort): the 
percentages of migrant entrepreneurs on total entrepreneurs at the beginning 
and at the end of the sample period are not statistically different (2.24 per cent 
in 2004 and 2.16 per cent in June 2008). This evidence indicates that the 
survival rate is similar for the two kinds of entrepreneurs. Besides that, we 
perform the estimate of equation (iii) only on firms belonging to the 2004 
cohort. The results of the estimate (not reported) are similar to the ones 
concerning the total sample: both the coefficients of the interactions of credit 
history with the dummies identifying the Italian and migrant entrepreneurs are 
negative and the one associated with migrant entrepreneurs is higher in 
absolute value. This result confirms that the interest rate differential is not 
affected by the existence of a different survival bias between the two types of 
entrepreneur.  
 
 
4.2 Cultural proximity 
 
The interest rate differential may depend also on a cultural mismatch between 
borrowers and bank officers. To test this hypothesis we isolate two particular 
groups of entrepreneurs. First, among those entrepreneurs born in Italy we 
identify those which have not an Italian surname4 (e.g. they have a Chinese 
surname but they were born in Italy). We call these borrowers “second 
generation” migrant entrepreneurs. The access to the credit market should be 
easier for them since they were educated in Italy and know how Italian banks 
behave. Second, among entrepreneurs born abroad there might be someone 
                                                 
4 To identify non Italian surnames we look at the occurrences of each surname in the CR (for both 
households and sole proprietorships). We assume that a surname is foreign if the number of 
borrowers with that surname born abroad is greater than the number of those born in Italy and 
their total number is at least equal to 100.  
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with an Italian surname, indicating that their family was originally Italian. We 
call them “Italian migrants”.5 Indeed, their Italian origin may help them better 
overcome some skepticism and mistrust from Italian banks. These two groups of 
entrepreneurs represent a non negligible share of the sample: “second 
generation” entrepreneurs represent 8 per cent of the Italian ones, the “Italian 
migrants” over 40 per cent of the migrants.  
 
We estimate the following equation: 
 
(iv)   ri,j,t = α + θimmij + φsndgenj + ξItalian migrantsj + βfirmj,t +  γcrediti,j,t + δpublic aidj,t + 
μcredit historyj,t + ρtimet + εi,j,t   
 
where sndgen and Italian migrants are dummy variables which identify, 
respectively, the “second generation” and “Italian migrants” entrepreneurs. 
 
The results of the estimates (table 4, column 2) indicate that “pure” migrants 
pay the highest interest rate (79 basis points more than “pure” Italian 
entrepreneurs, i.e. Italians net of “second generation” ones); “Italian migrants” 
pay 55 basis points6 more, while “second generation” entrepreneurs pay only 19 
basis points more than “pure” Italians. These findings suggest that cultural 
differences between the host and the home country may fuel banks’ skepticism 
and mistrust against migrants. Indeed, among migrants, those who were 
originally Italian pay 24 basis points less for credit compared to other migrants. 
Furthermore, among Italians, being born and educated in Italy is such that 
those who were originally foreigners pay little more for credit than Italians.  
 
We then test whether interest rate differential narrow in a different way among 
those groups of entrepreneurs when their credit history lengthens. To this aim 
we estimate the following equation: 
 
(v)   ri,j,t = α + θimmij + σnoimmij + φsndgenj + ξItalian migrantsj + βfirmj,t +   γcrediti,j,t + 
δpublic aidj,t +τcredit historyi,j,t + λcredit historyi,j,t*noimmij + μcredit historyi,j,t*immij 
+ νcredit historyi,j,t*sndgenj,t + πcredit historyi,j,t*Italian migrantsj  + ρtimet + εi,j,t   
 
where we add the interactions between credit history and immi, noimmi, sndgen 
and Italian migrants dummies. We find (table 4, column 3) that “second 
generation” and “Italian migrants” don’t benefit from the lengthening of their 
credit history more than Italian and migrant entrepreneurs respectively (i.e. the 
coefficients of the interaction between the variables sndgen and Italian migrants 
and the variable credit history are positive and statistically significant, even if 
they are economically negligible). A notable implication of these results is that 
the interest rate differential for “second generation” firms reduces very slowly, 
indicating a persistent mistrust of banks against entrepreneurs with a foreign 
family name, notwithstanding they were born in Italy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 We follow a similar rule to that used for “second generation” migrants. See footnote 4. 
6 The “Italian migrant” entrepreneurs are a subset of migrants; the interest rate differential is then 
obtained by summing the coefficients estimated for the variables immi and Italian migrants. 
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4.3 Migrant social networking 
 
Anecdotal evidence (Unioncamere, 2007) suggests that migrants are socially 
interconnected. This may compensate for the lack of individual credit history, 
helping them to access the credit market in different ways and thus lowering the 
cost of credit. First, migrants may benefit from the reputation gained by other 
people from the same country. Banks may exploit cross-sectional data to infer 
some migrant behavioral characteristics which may affect their default risk. 
Second, the minorities may behave as community. This may imply that the most 
trustworthy migrant entrepreneurs play as mentors, helping firms which lack 
credit history access the credit market. This may also mean that people from the 
same community may be backed by a sort of informal mutual guarantee which 
lowers the loss given default for lenders. Indeed, members from the same 
community, in order to save the reputation of their ethnic group, may want to 
help member firms in case of financial distress, preventing them from 
defaulting. Third, a sort of internal credit market may be working within 
communities. The most trustworthy community members may borrow money 
from banks to subsequently finance less creditworthy members. Fourth, being a 
community with a solid reputation may create strong incentives to peer 
monitoring within the group members, contributing to lower default risk. All 
these channels relate more to migrant entrepreneurs than to other migrants 
because the first ones can build their trustworthiness through their business 
performance and their behavior in the banking relationships.   
 
In order to measure what we name “network effect” we make two assumptions. 
First, communities are made of people coming from the same country. Second, 
physical proximity is required to make the community working. For these 
reasons, we define a variable (network1) which is equal to the number of 
migrant entrepreneurs coming from the same country and headquartered in the 
same municipality.  
 
The results of the estimates (table 5, column 1) indicate the existence of a 
strong “network effect”: interest rates are 16 basis points lower when the 
number of community members increases by ten units. We replicate our 
estimates by measuring the network effect at the province level (network2). 
Column 2 shows  that the effect is weaker when the area where the community 
is located is extended from a municipality to the province, supporting the view 
that social interaction requires physical proximity.  
 
 
4.4 The supply side 
 
As mentioned before, the fourth channel for “bridging the gap” between 
migrants and the banking system may be to improve the ability of banks to deal 
with cultural diversities by, for example, offering specific products which are 
tailored to migrant characteristics, by opening multiethnic points or by the 
adoption of specific projects supported by foundations and public institutions.  
 
As we mentioned in section 4.1, migrants face higher cost of credit when they 
lack a sufficiently long credit history. This problem may be quite severe when 
the banking system has accumulated little knowledge of foreign entrepreneurs 
and it has not invested in improving their ability to interact with them and in 
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developing financial products suited for their necessities. To test if banks have 
really upgraded their ability to interact with migrants facilitating their access to 
credit and lowering the migrant/Italian interest rate differential, we estimate the 
benchmark equation on a sample of firms whose relationship with the banking 
system is less than 2-year old in the first and the last quarter of the sample 
period. If our hypothesis is correct, the differential between interest rates 
applied to micro firms run by migrants and by Italians should be lower in the 
last quarter of the sample period, after controlling that monetary policy 
tightening has not an asymmetric effect on interest rates charged on migrant 
and Italian entrepreneurs. 7 The results of the estimates confirm our hypothesis: 
the interest rate differential in the last quarter of our sample is 30 basis points 
lower than the one in the first quarter (table 6, columns 2 and 3). The upgrading 
of bank supply for migrants determines a decrease in interest rate differential 
between migrant and Italian entrepreneurs at the beginning of their relationship 
with the banking system. 
 
 
5.
                                                
 Conclusions 
 
During the last years migrant entrepreneurship has rapidly spread in Italy. The 
financing of migrant firms presents some specificities, only partially investigated 
by the economic literature. In this paper we concentrate on the cost of bank 
credit.  
 
According to the results of the empirical analysis, migrant entrepreneurs pay 
interest rates almost 70 basis points higher than those paid by the Italian ones. 
Results of the “natural experiment” represented by the lowering of the CR 
threshold suggest that, if any, our estimates tend to underestimate the interest 
rate differential between migrants and natives. 
 
The lengthening in the credit history of entrepreneurs lowers interest rates; this 
effect is stronger for migrants, narrowing the differential between the interest 
rates charged to the two types of entrepreneur. We interpret this stronger effect 
as a form of “financial integration”, through which banks increase their 
knowledge about clients characterized by higher ex-ante “opaqueness”, and 
migrant entrepreneurs learn the functioning of the Italian banking system.  
 
This interpretation is coherent with the empirical results concerning the cost of 
credit for two other kinds of entrepreneurs, characterized by different degrees of 
cultural integration: the “second generation” ones, born in Italy but whose 
parents came from other countries, and the “Italian migrants”, born in other 
countries but whose parents were born in Italy. According to the results of the 
estimates, the “second generation” entrepreneurs pay interest rates slightly 
higher than the Italian ones, while “Italian migrants” entrepreneurs pay interest 
rates lower than those paid by “pure” migrants. 
 
 
7 To this purpose we add two interaction terms between a dummy variable which identifies the 
quarters in which monetary policy has been tightened (restr) and the two dummy variables 
identifying migrant and non migrant entrepreneurs (immi and noimmi). In particular, we identify 
the period of monetary tightening (since December 2005 until December 2007) considering both 
the rise in official interest rates and in the 3-month interest rate in the interbank market. The 
results of the estimate show that the coefficients associated to the two interaction terms are not 
statistically different (table 6, column 1). 
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We also find that the size of the migrant community may, at least partially, 
compensate for the lack of an individual credit history. As the number of firms 
headquartered in a given municipality increases the interest rate declines.  
 
Finally, the improvement in the ability of the Italian banking system to interact 
with migrants has determined a decrease in the interest rate differential 
between migrant and Italian entrepreneurs at the beginning of their relationship 
with the banking system.  
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Table 1 
 
Main features of micro firms 
(March 2004 - June 2008) 
 
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 >59 TOTAL
Number of micro firms 
owned by migrants (a) 503              1,756             1,557            606              198              4,620           
percentage shares 10.9 38.0 33.7 13.1 4.3 100.0
Number of micro firms 
owned by Italians (b) 13,772         54,437           68,213          52,772         33,800         222,994       
percentage shares 6.2 24.4 30.6 23.7 15.2 100.0
Agricolture Manufacturing Construction Trade
Hotel and 
restaurant 
services
Other 
services TOTAL
Number of micro firms 
owned by migrants (a) 139              966                1,140            1,077           339              959              4,620           
percentage shares 3.0 20.9 24.7 23.3 7.3 20.8 100.0
Number of micro firms 
owned by Italians (b) 24,897         42,869           34,286          58,176         13,138         49,628         222,994       
percentage shares 11.2 19.2 15.4 26.1 5.9 22.3 100.0
More than 20 
employees
Beetween 5 
and  20 
employees
Less than 5 
employees
More than 20 
employees
Beetween 5 
and  20 
employees
Less than 5 
employees TOTAL
Number of micro firms 
owned by migrants (a) 23                101                2,052            34                85                2,325           4,620           
percentage shares 0.5 2.2 44.4 0.7 1.8 50.3 100.0
Number of micro firms 
owned by Italians (b) 1,481           7,975             77,113          1,439           4,861           130,125       222,994       
percentage shares 0.7 3.6 34.6 0.6 2.2 58.4 100.0
Source : Central Credit Register.
 (a) Individual  firms owned by entrepreneur not born in Norway, Switzerland or in a EU15 country.
 (b) Individual  firms owned by entrepreneur  born in Norway, Switzerland or in a EU15 country.
Age of the entrepreneur
Artisans Non artisans
Sector
Size 
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Table 2 
 
Variable names and definitions 
 
Name Mean Std. Deviation
R 9.62 2.701
Migrant entrepreneur 0.02 0.123
Second generation 0.02 0.131
Italian migrant 0.01 0.109
Age 49.60 12.024
Public aid 0.01 0.103
Loan size 11.54 1.064
Real Guarantees 0.14 0.349
Bad loans 0.01 0.118
Multiple lending 0.46 0.499
Credit history 2.94 0.914
Amount of the outstanding loans (in log)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is required a 
real guarantee (0 if not)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has insolvency 
problems (0 if not)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has multiple 
lending relationships
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is run by 
migrants (0 if not) 
Time elapsed since the first entry of the firm in the Central 
Credit Register in years
Description 
Interest rate charged to firm j by bank i on overdraft facilities
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is run by an 
Italian migrant (0 if not)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is run by a 
second generation migrant (0 if not)
Entrepreneurs' age
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has received 
public aid (0 if not)
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Table 3 
Micro firms and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft facilities), in percentage 
points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The "balanced" sample is obtained by identifying first the 
combination of  "lender-firm sector-firm size-firm town-firm gender-firm first year of reporting to the CR” among migrants (7040 different 
combinations). Then we look for the same combination among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample 
where observations referred to migrants are  48 per cent of the total. "Pair" fixed effects in columns 4 and 5 allow us to jointly control for "lender-firm 
sector-firm size-firm town-firm gender-firm first year of reporting to the CR”. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-
tailed. 
Firm Characteristics
Migrant entrepreneur 0.6772 *** 0.6234 *** 0.9131 *** 0.6963 ***
0.0130 0.0201 0.0284 0.0350
Age -0.0189 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0199 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0077 ***
0.0001 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0012
Public aid -0.1552 *** 0.4258 *** 0.2937 ** 0.0880 0.0446
0.0155 0.1205 0.1195 0.1441 0.1441
Loan Characteristics
Loan size 0.0585 *** 0.1227 *** 0.1380 *** 0.0564 *** 0.0558 ***
0.0015 0.0091 0.0090 0.0081 0.0081
Real Guarantees 0.9333 *** 1.2225 *** 1.1992 *** 0.5710 *** 0.5618 ***
0.0046 0.0240 0.0238 0.0226 0.0226
Bad loans 1.5592 *** 1.1267 *** 1.1273 *** 0.5101 *** 0.5139 ***
0.0134 0.0704 0.0697 0.0657 0.0657
Bank-firm Relationship
Multiple lending -0.3713 *** -0.6381 *** -0.6794 *** -0.3412 *** -0.3327 ***
0.0035 0.0225 0.0223 0.0232 0.0232
Credit history -0.2105 *** -0.0929 *** -0.0941 *** -0.1628 *** -0.1579 ***
0.0021 0.0032 0.0032 0.0614 0.0614
Large bank 0.8840 ***
0.0272
Large bank*migrant entrepreneur -0.4067 ***
0.0382
Migrant continent of origin
North America and Oceania 0.2232
0.1444
Central and Latin America 0.2341 ***
0.0848
Asia 0.3727 ***
0.0719
Africa 0.8504 ***
0.0569
Eastern Europe 1.3495 ***
0.0770
Constant 10.2520 *** 9.3531 *** 8.7338 *** 9.7190 *** 9.7238 ***
0.0213 0.1233 0.1236 0.2363 0.2364
Adjusted R-squared 0.1502 0.1603 0.1756 0.5933 0.5942
Number of observations 2,443,198 74,035 74,035 74,035 74,035
(5)
Baseline 
regression
Baseline 
regression Large Banks
"Pair" fixed 
effects
"Pair" fixed effects 
and migrant 
continent of origin
Variables
(1) (2)
Full sample Balanced sample
(3) (4)
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Table 4 
Financial integration, cultural proximity and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft facilities), in percentage 
points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The "balanced" sample is obtained by identifying first the combination 
of  "lender-firm sector-firm size-firm town-firm gender-firm first year of reporting to the CR” among migrants (7040 different combinations). Then we look 
for the same combination among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample where observations referred to 
migrants are  48 per cent of the total. In all regressions "pair" fixed effects are introduced; they allow  us to jointly control for "lender-firm sector-firm size-
firm town-firm gender-firm first year of reporting to the CR”. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Firm Characteristics
Migrant entrepreneur 1.0792 *** 0.7916 *** 1.1350 ***
0.0553 0.0412 0.0592
Second generation 0.1858 *** -0.0193
0.0474 0.1062
Italian migrant -0.2416 *** -0.3168 ***
0.0642 0.1145
Age -0.0072 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0073 ***
0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
Public aid 0.1127 0.0756 0.0946
0.1440 0.1441 0.1441
Loan Characteristics
Loan size 0.0560 *** 0.0552 *** 0.0554 ***
0.0081 0.0081 0.0081
Real Guarantees 0.5656 *** 0.5692 *** 0.5626 ***
0.0226 0.0226 0.0227
Bad loans 0.5279 *** 0.5127 *** 0.5329 ***
0.0657 0.0657 0.0657
Bank-firm Relationship
Multiple lending -0.3364 *** -0.3387 *** -0.3364 ***
0.0232 0.0232 0.0232
Credit history -0.1580 ***
0.0614
Credit history*Italian entrepreneur -0.1290 ** -0.1267 **
0.0615 0.0615
Credit history*migrant entrepreneur -0.1929 *** -0.1987 ***
0.0615 0.0617
Credit history*second generation 0.0257 **
0.0121
Credit history*native 0.0377 ***
0.0133
Constant 9.4911 *** 9.7008 *** 9.4985 ***
0.2375 0.2362 0.2376
Adjusted R-squared 0.5938 0.5935 0.6327
Number of observations 74,035 74,035 74,035
Cultural proximity Cultural proximity and credit historyVariables
Balanced sample
(1) (2) (3)
Credit history
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Table 5 
Network effect and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft facilities), in 
percentage points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The sample is composed of observations only 
concerning migrant entrepreneurs. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Migrant continent of origin
Central America 0.3549 ** 0.3606 **
0.1443 0.1443
Latin America -0.0010 0.0031
0.0514 0.0514
Asia 0.6404 *** 0.6244 ***
0.0548 0.0547
Africa 0.3785 *** 0.3769 ***
0.0511 0.0512
Eastern Europe 0.4897 *** 0.4935 ***
0.0545 0.0545
Firm Characteristics
Age -0.0276 *** -0.0277 ***
0.0014 0.0014
Public aid -0.3431 ** -0.3357 **
0.1449 0.1449
Loan Characteristics
Loan size 0.0940 *** 0.0941 ***
0.0125 0.0125
Real Guarantees 0.9030 *** 0.9027 ***
0.0293 0.0293
Bad loans 0.6524 *** 0.6552 ***
0.0780 0.0780
Bank-firm Relationship
Multiple lending -0.5681 *** -0.5816 ***
0.0306 0.0304
Credit history -0.1807 *** -0.1821 ***
0.0140 0.0140
Network1 -0.0157 ***
0.0038
Network2 -0.0036 **
0.0019
Constant 9.8975 *** 9.8884 ***
0.1936 0.1938
Fixed effects
Bank and province yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.3114 0.3112
Number of observations 37,574 37,574
Variables
(1) (2)
Migrants' sample
Municipality 
networking
Province 
networking
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Table 6 
Bank supply evolution and loan interest rates 
This table lists the coefficients from a regression with the loan rate charged to sole proprietorships on credit lines (overdraft facilities), in percentage 
points, as the dependent variable. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. The "balanced" sample is obtained by identifying first the combination 
of  "lender-firm sector-firm size-firm town-firm gender-firm first year of reporting to the CR” among migrants (7040 different combinations). Then we look 
for the same combination among natives, excluding the other ones left. We end up with a highly balanced sample where observations referred to 
migrants are  48 per cent of the total. "Pair" fixed effects in column 1 allow us to jointly control for "lender-firm sector-firm size-firm town-firm gender-firm 
first year of reporting to the CR”. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Firm Characteristics
Migrant entrepreneur 0.6684 *** 1.0291 *** 0.7275 ***
0.0382 0.1112 0.0852
Age -0.0076 *** -0.0186 *** -0.0193 ***
0.0012 0.0031 0.0029
Public aid 0.0883 0.0514 0.0562
0.1441 0.4360 0.3998
Loan Characteristics
Loan size 0.0563 *** 0.0537 0.1548 ***
0.0081 0.0345 0.0338
Real Guarantees 0.5710 *** 1.3670 *** 1.5161 ***
0.0226 0.0818 0.0752
Bad loans 0.5084 *** 1.6695 *** 0.8885 ***
0.0657 0.3005 0.2584
Bank-firm Relationship
Multiple lending -0.3410 *** -0.4023 *** -0.4627 ***
0.0232 0.1046 0.0897
Credit history -0.1628 ***
0.0614
Monetary tightening*Italian entrepreneur 1.1384 ***
0.2044
Monetary tightening*migrant entrepreneur 1.1907 ***
0.2047
Constant 9.7307 *** 9.0744 *** 8.2862 ***
0.2363 0.5162 0.5090
Fixed effects
Bank and province yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.5934 0.2642 0.2418
Number of observations 74,035 5,991 6,569
2nd quarter 
sample
"Supply side effect"
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Monetary policy 
neutrality
Balanced 
sample
1st quarter 
sample
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